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Consider the choices available to a shopper driving to a city and trying to park 
downtown. One option, typical to many cities, is to follow the signposts to an off-street 
parking facility, which is often privately operated. Another option is to search for an on-street 
spot. If this proves unsuccessful, it is always possible to return to the off-street facility. 
We formalise such a setting and examine optimal on-street parking policy in the 
presence of an off-street market. Not surprisingly, the amount of socially-wasteful searching 
behaviour is shown to depend on the prices of both the off- and on-street market. If the off-
street market is run competitively, optimal on-street policy reduces to a simple and attractive 
rule: set the on-street price equal to the resource cost of off-street parking supply. Other 
pricing rules result in either excessive searching behaviour or excessive off-street investment 
costs. Time restrictions – a common alternative to on-street fees – are also shown to be 
inefficient. 
In practice, however, off-street markets are unlikely to be competitive. We examine 
the case of a single off-street supplier playing as a Stackelberg follower to the government 
regulated on-street market. Based on a numerical example (calibrated to London), optimal on-
street policy is shown to either involve setting a relatively high on-street price, such that the 
monopolist is induced to undercut and gain the entire parking demand, or setting a relatively 
low price, while the monopolist maximises profit on the residual demand curve. Which 
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A small but growing literature is emerging on the economic analysis of urban parking 
policy. The growth in this literature is probably due to the recognition that, despite a large 
literature on urban road tolling, parking regulation continues to be one of the most widespread 
forms of intervention by urban governments in the transport market.  
A natural benchmark in the discussion of parking policy is the first-best pricing of on-
street parking spots, or, in other words, the optimal pricing of on-street space in the absence 
of other distortions, most notably those associated with road use
1.  
Three recent papers (Verhoef et al., 1995, Arnott and Rowse, 2001, -henceforth AR 
and Anderson and de Palma, 2002 – henceforth AP) have considered the first best pricing of 
on-street parking. All these articles – and the non-formal seminal piece in this area by 
William Vickrey (1959) – analyse the problem abstracting from the presence of an off-street 
parking market.  
This seems overly-restrictive. To fix ideas, consider a shopper driving downtown and 
deciding where to park.  In many cities, a driver can follow clearly marked signs to a 
downtown off-street parking facility. These facilities are often run by the private sector and 
are subject to a per time unit fee. An alternative option is to search for a vacant on-street spot. 
This involves some extra effort, but, if successful, the driver may benefit from paying a lower 
price (or in a number of cities, a zero price) than the off-street market. If the search process is 
not successful, the driver can always return to the off-street market. 
We construct a simple model to analyse optimal parking regulation in this type of 
situation. If the private off-street market is competitive, we derive the simple welfare 
maximising policy rule: set the per time unit on-street price equal to the resource cost of off-
street parking. Pricing lower than this rate induces too many drivers to invest in socially 
wasteful searching. Pricing higher than this rate induces all drivers to use the off-street 
market, which results in excessive supply costs (compared with driver using the zero-resource 
cost on-street space). 
This optimal ‘matching’ result differs qualitatively from the findings in the literature. 
Vickrey’s discussion implicitly assumes an aggregate demand curve for on-street parking 
                                                      
1 As part of the wider road-pricing debate, several authors have concentrated on the second-best pricing 
of space: i.e. the optimal parking price in the absence of external charges on road use. See – for 
example, Arnott et al., 1991, Glazer and Niskanen, 1992 and Calthrop et al., 2000. Whilst this is an   4
defined over own-price alone, and hence suggests a policy of peak-load pricing
2. The more 
realistic specification adopted here, however, suggests a qualitatively different (and simpler) 
policy response: just match the off-street price. 
Both AR and AP-V
3 consider on-street pricing in explicitly spatial settings. Different 
parking spots are not perfect substitutes for one another. In both papers, the basic normative 
insight is qualitatively similar. First-best prices are set equal to marginal external cost. In AR, 
based on a symmetric homogeneous city located on the outside of a circle, this amounts to the 
additional searching time imposed upon other would-be parkers from the decision to park for 
an additional unit of time. Due to symmetry, the optimal parking fee is independent of 
location. In AP-V
4, adopting a linear city, spots nearer to the single point city centre are more 
desirable than those further away (due to reduced walk time). Marginal external cost at 
location x is equal to the increase in search costs imposed on other parkers at location x. Due 
to greater desirability of parking spots nearer the centre, and hence greater demand, the 
optimal parking fee increases with proximity to the CBD.  
These findings are important and relate primarily to the explicitly spatial nature of the 
search process. However, as stressed above, they abstract from the presence of an off-street 
market. We focus on the on- off- street choice, but adopt a highly reduced form representation 
of space. We comment further on this specification issue in our conclusions (section VI). 
We extend our basic model in two directions, both new to the literature. Firstly, in 
contrast to other authors, we examine both quantity and price regulation. In many urban areas, 
on-street time restrictions are a common alternative to meter fees. We show that a simple time 
restriction, in which the driver pays no charge as long as he parks for less than a given length 
of time, is less efficient than optimal price regulation – even when the restriction is set 
optimally. A time restriction distorts driver choice between the on- and off-street market, and 
too many drivers end up searching for a vacant on-street space. 
Secondly, we consider the optimal on-street pricing policy in the realistic setting of a 
non-competitive off-street market. This can be considered as an example of optimal pricing 
                                                                                                                                                        
important subset of the literature, we expect second-best pricing rules to emerge as deviations from 
first best price. Indeed, this is confirmed in the recent paper by Anderson and de Palma (2002).  
2 Vickrey’s article does far more that suggest peak-load pricing. He goes on to consider the more 
realistic problem of peak-load pricing under demand uncertainty, and comes up with the appealing idea 
of allowing the meter fee rate to depend on the number of occupied spaces in the surrounding vicinity. 
AR suggest, however, that this will only result in a first-best allocation if drivers are informed of the 
entire time profile of demand. 
3 The article AP can be seen as a generalisation of the earlier paper by Verhoef et al., 1995. Both papers 
consider a linear city with both search and road use externalities. Both consider the optimal parking 
span. AP, however, also consider a monopolistically competitive market outcome and show, in 
generality, that this outcome does not decentralise the social optimum. We adopt the notation AP-V to 
refer to the two papers together.   5
taking into account pre-existing distortions on other markets à la Harberger, 1974. In a simple 
Stackelberg setting, in which the government (the leader) plays against a single off-street 
supplier (the follower), we show that optimal policy deviates from the matching result. Rather 
the optimal on-street price may be higher or lower than the off-street price. Setting a 
relatively low on-street price alleviates welfare losses from using the distorted off-street 
market, but at the cost of inducing too much searching. In contrast, setting a relatively high 
on-street price induces the off-street monopolist to undercut the on-street market. Search costs 
are minimised but welfare costs associated with the non-competitive price and higher supply 
costs of the off-street market remain. Surprisingly, for reference parameter values, the latter 
case applies: the optimal price is such that the on-street market is undercut. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section II we set out the basic model. 
Section III examines the centralised allocation problem: how would demand be allocated to 
supply if government can control all driver decisions? This is an important benchmark. 
Section IV compares the optimal centralised allocation with that attainable under 
decentralised decision making, under the assumption that the off-street market is supplied by 
a perfectly competitive market. Both linear and non-linear pricing schedules are considered. 
Section V relaxes the competitive off-street market assumption. Results are derived 
analytically and optimal values are computed with a numerical example. Sensitivity analysis 
investigates the generality of findings. Section VI concludes.  
A final word on the generality of the model. We conjecture that the findings in this 
paper (in the context of parking policies) may be relevant to the general theory on the public 
provision of private goods. The essential assumption of the  model is such that the public 
sector has a cost advantage to the private sector, at least for an initial number of units. 
Rationing is random. This structure suggests a relevance to the health sector (with rationing 
by waiting times) or utility provision (with rationing by shortage). 
 
 
II.  The Model  
 
II.1. Parking  technology 
 
There are two parking markets. The on-street market (indexed by X ) has a fixed 
supply of spaces, such that demand equals on-street supply when each individual parks for Q 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 AP consider the optimal pricing of on-street space with search congestion and cruising congestion. As 
we are not concerned with road congestion (or assumed that it is internalised via a fee), we refer to the 
results of AP on search congestion only.   6
units of time. These spots are assumed sufficiently close to one another, such that any spot on 
market X is a perfect substitute for any other.  The off-street market (indexed by Y ) can be 
thought of as a single off-street parking facility subject to constant returns to scale, with the 
resource cost of an additional unit of parking time given by C , where 01 C < < .  
 
II.2. Consumer  payoffs 
 
Assume a continuum of identical risk-neutral consumers. Each consumer enjoys a 
benefit from time parked in the urban centre during the peak-period. To keep matters simple, 
assume that utility is defined in a quasi-linear fashion. Utility from parking time is denoted by 
) (t u , where t denotes the time parked, and furthermore is specified by a quadratic form such 
that the marginal benefit from an additional unit of time parked,  ) (t u′  is given by t − 1  . 
Given this specification of consumer preferences, it is clear that the two parking markets are 
perfect substitutes
5. 
On either market, a consumer decides how long to stay on the basis of a constant per 
time unit fee,  i p , where  {} Y X i , ∈ . (In section IV.2 below, we explore the use of a non-
linear fee schedule). Prices are assumed to be perfectly and costlessly enforceable
6. Each 
consumer parks until the marginal benefit of an additional unit of stay equals the cost: 
i i i p p t − =1 ) (
* . Consumer surplus
7, conditional on using a particular market i, is denoted by 
) ( i p v . 
By assumption, a driver can proceed directly to the off-street market and enjoy 
surplus  ) ( Y p v . Alternatively, a driver may search for an on-street space, and finds a vacant 
on-street space with probabilityρ , which is explicitly derived below. If the driver fails to find 
a vacant spot, however, he or she returns to the off-street market, incurring an additional cost 
d . 
This cost can be interpreted literally as the driving costs (gasoline, time etc) of 
returning from the on-street to the off-street market. However, it is intended as a reduced from 
                                                      
5 This assumption can be relaxed. On-street parking may be closer to desired destination or may give a 
higher feeling of safety than the off-street market. In a model with identical individuals, however, this 
difference acts as a fixed term. Results, therefore, up to a fixed term, are not altered. Comments on 
preference heterogeneity are made in the concluding section. 
6 See Calthrop (2001) Chapter 4 for a model of optimal on-street parking pricing in the presence of 
costly enforcement. 
7 Given the quasilinear formulation, indirect utility of the consumer is equal to consumer surplus 
() i vp  plus income.   7
representation of a search cost. In expected terms, consumer surplus from searching on-street 
can be expressed as: 
 () [ 1 ] [ () ] sX Y vv p v p d ρ ρ =+ − −  
which re-arranges to give: 
  () [ () () ] [ 1 ] SY X Y vv p v p v p d ρ ρ =+ − − −  (1) 
If he fails to find a vacant on-street spot, the driver can always park off-street and 
make a reservation level of utility,  () Y vp . In addition, assuming that the price of on-street 
parking is lower than the off-street market, with probability ρ , he finds a vacant spot and 
makes the net consumer surplus of  ()() XY vp vp − . 
Expected search cost is given by the last term on the right hand side, [1 ]d ρ − . 
Increasing the on-street price reduces the optimal length of stay, 
*
X t  . This – as will be shown 
below- increases the probability of finding a vacant on-street spot, ρ . Expected search cost 
falls. This is the key mechanism derived by AR using a more structural representation of the 
search process based on stochastic queueing theory
8.  
 
II.3. Rationing  rule 
 
The probability of finding a vacant spot is assumed to be given by a random-rationing 
rule. Denoting the percentage of drivers that choose to search for an on-street spot is denoted 
by λ , this is given by: 













This rule approximates a situation in which drivers arrive in a downtown area more or 
less at random. We consider this to be well-suited to modelling downtown areas used for 
shopping and leisure activities. It is far less relevant to workplace parking, where spots are 
often reserved. 
 
                                                      
8 Applying standard queueing theory, expected waiting time for a M/D/1 system is given 
by:
2 2(1 ) λ ρµ −  where λ is the expected arrival rate, µ is the service rate (the inverse of the length 
of stay) and ρ  is the utilisation rate or λ µ . Increasing the length of stay acts to increase the 
expected wait time. In AR, the same mechanism exists: the expected cruising distance to find a vacant 
spot is given by 1/P, where P is the average density of vacant spaces. Increasing the density of vacant 
spaces reduces expected cruising distance (or search cost).   8
II.4.  Equilbrium number of searchers 
 
In equilibrium, no driver can increase expected consumer surplus by switching from 
searching to not searching or vice-versa. For a non-symmetric equilibrium (i.e. 01 λ << ), 
this implies: 
  (,, ) () SXY Y vpp v p λ =  (3) 
We can solve for the equilibrium number of searchers, 
* λ . Comparing (3) and (1) 
shows that, in equilibrium, a number of drivers choose to search such that the expected net 
consumer surplus from searching,  [( ) ( ) ] XY vp vp ρ − equals the expected search 
cost,[1 ]d ρ − . Allowing for the possibility of a symmetric equilibrium, in which all drivers 
search or not, gives: 
  {}
*
1i f ( )



















Below a critical price level,  () XX Y Y p pp p < < all drivers choose to search
9: 
* 1 λ = . 
The price of on-street parking is low in comparison with the on-street market, and hence the 
expected net consumer surplus from successfully finding a vacant on-street spot 
[( ) ( ) ] XY vp vp ρ −  is sufficiently high, even when all drivers choose to search, to offset the 
expected search cost (1 )d ρ − .  
At a price slightly higher than this level, only a subset of drivers 
* 1 λ <  choose to 
search. The expected net consumer surplus is relatively small, such that the expected search 
cost is offset only when a subset of drivers choose to search. If the on-street price exactly 
matches the off-street price, the expected net consumer surplus is zero. Drivers may choose to 
search only if the expected search cost also equals zero – in other words, that the probability 
of finding a vacant spot equals 1. In this case
10,  [ ]
* 1 Y Qp λ =− . 
                                                      
9 This requires a condition that the size of the search cost parameter d not be too large. If it were, the 
net gain from finding a vacant on-street space can be outweighed by the expected search cost, even at a 
very low on-street price. In the analytical model that follows, we rule this out by assuming that 
(0, ) 1 C λ > . Making this assumption simplifies the model, but results are not dependent upon it. Note 
that this condition is also met in the reference values for the numerical example.  
10 Given the perfect substitutability between markets, if the prices are equal, any number of drivers 
could search in the range  { }
* [0, 1 ] Y Qp λ ∈− . We resolve this indeterminacy by assuming that, at 
the critical price level, drivers prefer to park on-street. This leads to a crisp optimal price result – but 
taking other assumptions would not alter the essence of the results below.   9
If the on-street price is set above the off-street price, however, all drivers proceed 
directly to the off-street market: 
* 0 λ = . This leads to discontinuity in the 
* λ at the price 
XY p p = . 
 
II.5.  Expected social welfare 
 
Expected social welfare (per individual) is given by: 
  { }
** *
**
(,) [ 1 ] [ ]
[1 ]{ ( ) [ ] }
XY S X X Y Y
YYY







Welfare is a weighted sum of the consumer surplus and expected net revenue from 
searching and proceeding directly to the off-street market. The weights, of course, correspond 
to the equilibrium percentage of searchers and non-searchers. This function is, naturally, also 
discontinuous at the price  XY p p = . 
 
 
III. Centralised  Allocation 
 
 
Before turning to the maximisation of social welfare with respect to parking prices, 
consider the optimal allocation when government can control driver actions (consisting of a 
set of three variables ( ,, XY ttλ ) directly, rather than indirectly via two prices ( , XY p p ). 
Clearly, equation (4) no longer applies. 
It can never be efficient for searchers to fail to find an on-street spot. In any optimal 
allocation, therefore,  X tQ λ ≤ . The objective function for the government is given by: 
  ()[ 1 ] [ () ] XY Y ut ut C t λ λ + −−  (6) 




















The optimisation problem facing the government is the maximisation of (6) with 
respect to  , XY tt  and λ , subject to the set of constraints (7).    10
The optimal solution
11 depends on two parameters: Q and C , though recall by 
assumption that  1 C < . Using the superscript C to denote the optimal Centralised allocation 
variable level: there are three qualitatively different optimal solutions: 
Consider as a first case  1 Q >  (Case 1). With such a large on-street supply, there is no 
rationing problem. All parking demand ( 1 X t λ = = ) can be met (at zero resource cost) by the 
on-street market. Hence the off-street market is not used (and thus  Y t  is indeterminate). The 
solution ( 1; 1; indeterminate
CCC
XY tt λ == ) is optimal, as is confirmed in Annex 1. 
Now consider the case  1 Q < . One candidate solution is that all drivers are allocated 
to the on-street market such that demand is met by on-street supply. Thus,  1, 1 X tQ λ == < . 
Imagine marginally increasing the length of stay of on-street parkers. Drivers gain (1-Q) in 
additional benefit. But due to the constraint  X tQ λ ≤ , exactly 1/Q drivers must be re-
allocated from the on-street to the off-street market. Given that the off-street market is priced 
at resource cost, the social cost of switching a driver is given by  () () uQ vC − . The total 







−− +  
Multiplying through by  Q − , the sign of the welfare change is given by: 
  (1 ) ( ) vQ v C − −  (8) 
Hence the critical condition for using the off-street market is whether 1 Q −  is greater 
than or less than C , i.e. whether shadow price of an additional unit of on-street parking time 
(given that all drivers park on-street) is less than or greater than the resource cost of off-street 
space.  
This gives rise to two further cases. If 1 QC − <  (Case 2), the optimal allocation of 
demand does not use the off-street market. The shadow price of additional on-street parking 
time is smaller than the resource cost of off-street parking. Annex 1 confirms that the optimal 
allocation in this case is given by ( 1; ; indeterminate
CC C
XY tQ t λ == ). 
Conversely, if 1 QC −> (Case 3), the shadow price of additional on-street parking 
time (given that the off-street market is not used) is greater than the resource cost of off-street 
parking. The off-street market is used. The optimal length of stay off-street is such that the 
                                                      
11 Given the constraint  X tQ λ ≤ , the set of feasible solutions is non-convex. Constraint qualification 
can be shown to hold, however, and hence the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary but not sufficient 
for an optimum. However, there is a unique optimum.   11
marginal benefit of an additional unit of time, 1 Y t −  equals the marginal cost, C . Hence, 
1
C
Y tC =− . 
If the off-street market is used, it follows that 
C
X tQ > . Moreover, simple 
manipulations (similar to those used to derive equation (8)) show that at the optimal on-street 
stay, the social benefit from marginally increasing the length of on-street stay (net of the loss 
in on-street parking welfare to those drivers who, as a result, are forced to park off-street), 
which is given by  (1 ) /
C
X vtQ − , must equal the social benefit from parking off-street 
() / vC Q. Hence  1
CC
XY tC t = −=, i.e. drivers park for an equal length of time on either 
parking market. Given this length of stay, the optimal number of on-street parkers equals 
{ } 11
C QC λ =− ≤ . Again, the formal derivation of this result appears in Annex 1. 
Table 1 summarises the results under the three different assumptions concerning Q 
and C . Case 1 requires no policy response, and is essentially uninteresting. 
 
  C
X t  
C λ  
C
Y t  
1.  1 Q >   1 1  - 
2. 11 CQ −<≤   Q  1 - 
3.  1 QC ≤−   1 C −   { } 1 QC −   1 C −  
Table 1 Summary of central allocation results 
 
Under Case 2, the on-street length of stay is limited, but all demand is allocated to the 
on-street market. Both Vickrey (1959) and Arnott and Rowse (1999) consider the optimal 
pricing of on-street parking in the absence of the off-street parking market. These papers can 
be considered as implicitly assuming that Case 2 applies. However, for large metropolitan 
areas, it is more realistic to consider Case 3. This justifies the use of an off-street market, 
which is observed in nearly all cities. Henceforth we assume Case 3 holds. For ease of 
comparison with later results, we collect the central finding in the form of a Lemma: 
 
Lemma 1   Assuming  1 QC ≤ − , the optimised central allocation is given by: 
  1
CC








Proof: Annex 1■   12
 
Figure 1 presents the results of a numerical example, calibrated to central London 
(see section V.1.1. for information on parameter values). Case 3 applies, as 
0.17 1 0.74 QC =< − =. The shaded area gives the non-convex solution space, defined over 
the two control variables available to the central planner: λ  and  X t . Iso-welfare functions are 
plotted (W1>W2>W3) as a function of the two variables, given that the length of stay off-street 
is set (optimally) at 1 C − . 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The highest welfare level is achieved at the point of tangency  10 . 7 4
C










IV.  Perfect competition on-street 
 
 
Can the optimal centralised allocation be decentralised via pricing instruments? We 
examine this problem under the assumption that the off-street market is perfectly competitive. 
The zero profit condition implies that  Y p C =  and thus 
*() 1
C
YY tC t C = =− . This is clearly a 
restrictive assumption and probably unrealistic. However, it establishes a benchmark case. 
The government’s problem is to price the on-street market in such a manner to induce 
driver behaviour in accordance with the two remaining conditions required for Lemma 1. We 
consider two cases: a linear and non-linear fee structure. 
 
IV.1.  Linear On-street price 
 
If the unit on-street fee  X p is set equal to the optimal off-street price, it is clear that 
** () 1 ()
C
XX Y tC t CtC == − = . Two of the three conditions of Lemma 1 are met. It is 
straightforward to show that the third and final condition is also met. 
Recall that expected net consumer surplus from searching on-street is given by 
[( ) ( ) ] XY vp vp ρ − . When prices are equal across markets, this equals zero. If expected 
search cost is strictly positive, all drivers are better off proceeding directly to the off-street   13
market. Thus, in equilibrium, expected search costs, [1 ]d ρ − , must equal zero. In 
equilibrium, therefore, { }
** (,, ) [ 1 ] 1 CC Q C ρλ λ = −= . Simple re-arrangement gives 
{ }
* 1
C QC λλ == −. This solution is also seen directly from equation (4). 
The main conclusion of this section is presented as a Proposition. 
 
Proposition 1     Given a perfectly competitive off-street parking market, a 
sufficient condition to maximise social welfare is to set the on-street price equal to the off-
street price
**
XY p pC == . The resulting allocation is identical to the optimal centralised 
allocation given in Lemma 1.  
Proof: In text   ■ 
 
The intuition for this result is closely related to that given under the centralised 
allocation under case 3: at the optimum, the marginal benefit from increasing the length of 
on-street stay equals the benefit from parking off-street. However, account needs to be taken 
of the equilibrium search condition. Recall that in the centralised allocation problem, the 
government has three control variables. In a decentralised solution, however, it has only two: 
the two price instruments. The number of searchers is set only indirectly, via the condition (4)
. However, the optimal centralised allocation can be decentralised. Equation (4) binds at the 
optimum, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The Figure plots (as a heavy line) the equilibrium number of searchers function 
(equation (4)) over the feasible solution space from the centralised allocation problem. The 
*(, ) X p C λ function is rewritten as 
*(1 , ) X tC λ −  to aid comparability. This function is seen to 
pass through the optimal point, 
** () ; (,)
CC
XX tC t C C λ λ == . The optimal allocation can be 
decentralised. 
Consider other pricing options. A greater-than-optimal price results in all drivers 
using the off-street market. The total cost of providing off-street parking is excessive (when 
compared to the optimum). Alternatively, a lower-than-optimal price results in too many 
drivers choosing to search. Total search costs are excessive (in comparison with the 
optimum). 
  
    14
IV.2.  Non-linear on-street fee 
 
Non-linear pricing schedules, including the limiting case of a time restriction, are 
commonly observed on the on-street parking market. Proposition 1 establishes that a linear 
fee is sufficient to implement the optimal centralised allocation. But it is clear that, at least in 
this model, any number of non-linear fee structures could do just as well. 
An optimal fee structure needs to ensure that two conditions are simultaneously meet: 
that each driver parks for 1 C −  units of time and that only 
C λ  drivers choose to search. An 
infinite number of fee structures meet these conditions. Define the total on-street fee paid as 
() X Ft . Consider, for instance, a ‘one-part’ fee structure given by: 
 







=  ∞ 
 
No driver parks for longer than 1-C units of time. For all time units less than 1 C − , 
the marginal cost is zero. Therefore if a driver uses the spot at all, he or she stays for exactly 
1 C −  units of time. Consumer surplus from a trip equals  () vC  and thus, as in the case of the 
linear fee, 
* C λ λ = . 
It is common to observe a quantity restriction, which we term a simple time 
restriction. This is a fee schedule in which parkers do not pay a fee, but are subject to a time 











A simple time restriction
12 cannot decentralise the optimal allocation. Consider a 
candidate solution,  1 rC =− . On-street parkers remain for the optimal length of time: 
* 1
C
XX tt C == − . Conditional on finding a vacant spot, however, an on-street parker receives 
consumer surplus equal to  (1 ) uC − , which re-arranges into  () ( 1 ) vC C C + − , in comparison 
with a payoff of  () vC  on the off-street market. Too many drivers choose to search as a result. 
The equilibrium number of searchers, denoted by 
*
r λ  is greater than 
C λ . 
To see this, re-write the percentage of searchers as: 
()
* (1 ) ( )
[1 ] [1 ] [1 ]
C
r
QQ C Q Q
uC v C d
Cd d C C
λ λ =− − + = + > =
−− −
 
                                                      
12 Infact any strictly convex fee schedule in which  (0) 0 X F =  fails to decentralise the optimal 
allocation. A simple time restriction is, of course, just the limiting case of such a function.   15
An alternative candidate solution is a time restriction such that the optimal number of 
drivers choose to search. This occurs if consumer surplus is equal across markets, i.e. 
() ( ) ur vC = . Simple manipulations show this to be the case if  1( 2 ) rC C = −− . But then 
drivers stay for too short a period of time:  1
C
X rt C < =− . 
Annex 2 derives the optimal simple time restriction. Not surprisingly, the optimal 
value of r falls between the two extreme cases discussed above. For the reference parameter 
values, the optimal value of r equals 0.71, which is less than  10 . 7 4
C
X tC =− =  but greater 
than the time restriction required to induce the optimal number of searchers, given by 
1 (2 ) 0.33 rC C =− − = . 
 
 
V. Off-street  market  power 
 
 
It is probably not realistic to assume that the urban off-street parking market is 
perfectly competitive. Spatial differentiation, at the very least, implies a degree of market 
power. We investigate the benchmark case in which a single operator supplies the off-street 
market. 
Moreover, we analyse the case of a simple sequential game, in which the government 
acts as a Stackelberg leader in the first stage
13. This seems reasonable: governments are often 
constrained in their ability to change prices quickly
14. The private off-street supplier observes 
this on-street price and responds by setting a profit-maximising off-street price. To simplify 
matters, both players are assumed to use a constant per time unit fee only. 
Under perfect competition, government can pursue a matching policy. When the off-
street market is non-competitive, however, the government will account for the reaction of the 
off-street supplier to any price set on-street. We derive the welfare-maximising government 
policy under these conditions and provide numerical results to highlight the findings.  
                                                      
13 In choosing for a Stackelberg framework, we assume that the government can commit to the price 
chosen in stage 1. Alternatively, we could analyse the Nash-equilibrium in a simultaneous move game. 
This has been done in Calthrop (2001). However, as explained there, the payoff of players are not 
quasi-concave in own price nor upper semi-continuous in the joint price vector. Equilibria in pure-
strategies need not exist (see Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). Mixed strategy equilibria may exist in this 
game, but are awkward to compute. We prefer the Stackelberg formulation, which seems plausible and 
provides Nash equilibria in pure-strategies. 
14 One reader of this paper has suggested that the opposite formulation: that of the government as 
follower is just as reasonable. However, we feel it is harder to justify the implicit assumption of 




As is standard, we solve the game backwards. 
 
Stage 2: Off-street supplier sets profit-maximising price 
 
For any given demand level, the off-street supplier maximises profit by setting the 
monopoly price,  1 (1 ) 2
m
Y p C = + . If the on-street price is set higher than this level 
(
m
XY p p > ), the off-street supplier responds by setting the monopoly price and captures the 
whole market.  
If the on-street price is lower than the monopoly price level, the supplier faces a 
simple choice. One option is to charge a price epsilon lower than the on-street market and, by 
capturing the whole market, earn profit  1() [ ] [ 1 ] XX X pp C p ε ε Π =− −− − . An alternative 
option is to charge the profit-maximising price, and earn maximum profit on the residual 
demand:  { } 2( ) [1 1 ][ ][1 ]
mm
XX Y Y p Qp p Cp Π= − − − − .  
There exists an on-street price, denoted by  (,) X I QC  below which the off-street 
supplier maximises profits by playing on the residual demand curve and above which he 
undercuts. This is given by:  12 () () XX I I Π= Π, where it follows that 
m
XY CI p <<. 

















 =− ≤ ≤ 
 > 
 (9) 
If the on-street price is relatively low  XX Cp I < < , undercutting is unattractive – for 
instance, if the on-street price is close to C, profit per unit of demand is small. Playing for the 
residual demand curve is a more profitable strategy. With a relatively low on-street price, any 
successful on-street parker remains for a relatively long period of time. The probability of 
finding a vacant spot is low, and hence the residual demand for the off-street market is 
relatively large. Charging the monopoly price on the residual demand curve is more profitable 
                                                                                                                                                        
government may abandon a strategy of setting the on-street price equal to the off-street marginal 
resource cost. 
15 We assume that at the on-street price  X I , the off-street supplier plays aggressively and undercuts.   17
than undercutting. This scenario is reversed, of course, if the on-street price is relatively high: 
m
XXY I pp <<. 
Using the implicit function theorem
16, we note that: 







Increasing the supply of on-street spaces acts to reduce the residual demand curve for 
off-street parking. Undercutting becomes a relatively more attractive option. If the resource 
cost of off-street space marginally increases, undercutting becomes a less attractive option.  
 
 
Stage 1: Government sets welfare maximising on-street price 
 
The government can compute the best-response function for the off-street supplier, 
given in equation (9). Using this information to maximise social welfare (in equation (5)), 
gives rise to the following optimisation problem: 
 
(,) i f






XX X X Y p
mm
XY X Y
Wp p p I
MaxW W p p I p p
Wp p p p
ε
 <
 =−≤ ≤ 
 > 
 
The optimal solution in the restricted parameter region  XX p I ≥  is simple. For any 
on-street price set in this region, the off-street supplier reacts by undercutting. All drivers use 
the off-street market. Maximising welfare is therefore equivalent to maximising social surplus 
on the off-street market. Given that  X I C > , this occurs at the lowest price possible i.e. the 
corner solution,  XX p I = . Social welfare is maximised on this restricted domain at the level: 
  () [ ] [ 1 ]
X IX X X Wv II C I =+ − −  (11) 
Welfare consists of the sum of consumer surplus plus profit from the off-street 
market. 
The optimal price in the region  XX p I <  is less obvious. To simplify matters, assume 
that the critical indifference price,  X I  is less than the price at which only a subset of drivers 
choose to search,  ()
m
XY p p  - this is the case for a wide range of parameter values
17. 
                                                      
16 Define an equation  12 (,, ) ( ) ( ) 0 XXX FQCI I I ≡Π −Π = . Taking the ratio of derivatives, and 
using the constraint 
m
XY CI p ≤≤ gives the desired result.   18
All drivers choose to search. Social welfare, given in equation (5), simplifies to: 
 
() [ () [ 1 ] ]




Wp vp p p






Consider the impact of raising the on-street fee. The direct effect on social welfare of 
on-street parkers from reducing the length of stay, in expected terms, is  X p ρ − . However, 
reducing the length of stay increases the probability of finding a vacant spot. This increases 
welfare (in expected terms) by  [( ) [ 1 ] ( ) [ ] [ 1 ] ]
mm m
XX X Y Y Y vp p p vp p C p d ρ′ + −− −−−+ . 
Assuming an interior solution
18, the optimal price raises the on-street price until these 
two effects offset one another. Noting that  [1 ] X p ρ ρ ′ = − , it is straightforward to derive an 
implicit expression for the optimal price level, denoted by 
1
X p : 
 
1 () () [ ] [ 1 ]
mm m
XY Y Y vp vp p C p d =+ − − −  (13) 
At the optimal on-street price, the on-street consumer surplus equals the social 
surplus on the off-street market net of the search cost (which, given that all drivers search, is 
incurred with certainty).  










Raising either of the two parameters, C or d, acts to decrease the net social surplus 
from the off-street market (the right-hand side of equation (13)) and thus increase the optimal 
on-street price. 
The optimality result derived in equation (13) can be used to simplify the expression 
for social welfare in equation (12). Social welfare evaluated at the optimal on-street price 
reduces to: 
  1
1 () [ ] [ 1 ]
X
mm m
XYY Y p WQ p v pp C p d = + +−−−  (15) 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Infact this holds for all parameter values tested: repeated random drawings from the sets 
[0.05,0.5], [0.05,0.4], [0.005,0.03] CQd ∈∈∈ . The results can easily – if somewhat 
tediously –be extended to include that case that  ()
m
XY X p pI < . The set of local optima needs to be 
extended somewhat. However, given that our numerical model suggests that this does not occur, we 
prefer to keep the text simple and ignore the possibility that the assumption is not met. 
18 To simplify exposition, we assume that 
1
XX p I <  and hence the locally optimal price is 
1
X p .This 
assumption holds for a wide range of values of model parameters, including the reference values. 
Moreover, the assumption can easily be relaxed, though little additional insight is gained, while there is 
a significant cost in terms of messier notation. 
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Social welfare can be evaluated as the sum of two components: the revenues 
generated from the on-street market plus the base level of social surplus gained if all drivers 
search and fail to find an on-street spot. This latter part consists of the consumer surplus plus 
profits from the off-street market, minus the search cost. 
The government faces a choice. It can set a relatively low on-street price equal to 
1
X p , in the knowledge that the off-street supplier maximises profit on the off-street market, 
and thus social welfare is given by (15). Alternatively, the government can set a relatively 
high on-street price, equal to  X I , thus inducing the off-street supplier to undercut the on-
street market, and achieving a level of social welfare given by equation (11). 
Setting a relatively low on-street price is desirable if  1 0
X X I p WW − > , which is the 
case if: 
 
1 () [ ] [ 1 ]




Qp d v I I C I
vp p C p
−> + − −
−− − −
 (16) 
i.e. if the revenue from the on-street market, net of the search cost d – the left-hand 
side of (16), exceed the net social surplus from inducing the off-street supplier to switch from 
monopoly pricing to undercutting the on-street market (the right-hand side). 
 
V.2. Numerical  Example   
 
V.2.1. Reference parameter values 
 












These values have been calibrated to the published literature on the on-street parking 
market in London for 1990. More information on this procedure can be found in Calthrop and 
Proost (2000). 
 
V.2.2. Reference results 
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Table 2 presents the welfare levels associated with the two locally optimal policies, 
1
X p  and  X I . If the government adopts price level 
1
X p , drivers choose between an on-street 
price equal to 0.391 and an off-street price at the monopolist level, 0.63. As a result all drivers 
choose to search, even though the probability of finding a vacant spot is only approximately 
one-third. 
  welfare level 
1
X p =0.391  0.252 
X I =0.429  0.260 
Table 2 Reference parameter value results 
Alternatively, the government can set a somewhat higher on-street price, equal to 
X I =0.429, and thus induce the off-street supplier to marginally undercut this price. All 
drivers proceed to the off-street market. 
Table 2 shows that the welfare level from setting an on-street price equal to  X I  
exceeds that from 
1
X p . Allowing the on-street market to be undercut induces all drivers not to 
search: search costs are saved. In addition, lower off-street prices result in higher social 
surplus gains on the off-street market. Against this, the on-street market is not used. More off-
street parking is provided (at cost C per unit) than would be the case were some drivers using 
the on-street market. 
The following section investigates the extent to which this result is determined by the 
choice of parameter values in the reference case. 
 
V.3. Sensitivity  tests 
 
V.3.1. Search cost parameter, d. 
 
Notice that the right-hand side of equation (16) does not depend on the value chosen 
for the search cost parameter d. The left hand side decreases in d, were, using equation (14), it 









. Therefore the net benefit from setting a relatively low price, 
1
X p  rather than  X I  falls in d. This is confirmed in Table 3, where cells report welfare levels 
for differing assumptions on the magnitude of d.  
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 d=0.005  d=0.02  d=0.035 
1
X p   0.264 0.252 0.241 
X I   0.260 0.260 0.260 
Table 3 Sensitivity tests on parameter d 
 
For a low value of the search cost parameter, d=0.005, Table 3 confirms that the 
optimal on-street price is 
1
X p  rather than  X I . The gain from using the on-street market spots 
(at zero resource cost) more than offset the low search costs resulting from inducing excessive 
numbers of drivers to search and the welfare loss from higher off-street prices. 
 
V.3.2. Supply of on-street space, Q. 
 
The impact of varying the supply of on-street space on welfare levels is shown in 
Table 4. Marginally increasing Q, increases the left-hand side of equation (16) by 
1
X p . 









 from equation (10)). For 
the numerical values shown in Table 4, it seems that the increase in the left-hand side 
outweighs that on the right-hand side, and increasing on-street supply increases the welfare 
from charging a relatively low price 
1
X p  more than from  X I .  
 
  Q=0.1 Q=0.17 Q=0.3 
1
X p   0.225 0.252 0.303 
X I   0.252 0.260 0.267 
Table 4 Sensitivity tests on parameter Q 
 
At a relatively high on-street supply, Q=0.3, we note that the government prefers a 
strategy of charging 
1
X p  to  X I . Having a relatively large supply of space (at zero resource 
cost) ensures that the government is more likely to ensure that the spaces are used, and thus 
the positive cost of providing off-street space is saved. 
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V.3.3. Resource cost of off-street space, C. 
 
Use of the relationships given in (14) and (10), show that a marginal increase in the 
off-street resource cost parameter C increases both the left-hand and right-hand side of 
equation (16). Table 5 presents results on the welfare levels associated with different 
assumptions regarding the magnitude of C. It shows that for the chosen range of values, 
marginally increasing the resource cost parameter reduces the welfare level from charging at 
1
X p  by less than that at  X I . 
 
  C=0.1 C=0.26 C=0.4 
1
X p   0.326 0.252 0.203 
X I   0.380 0.260 0.173 
Table 5 Sensitivity tests on parameter C 
 
Increasing the resource cost of off-street parking increases the opportunity cost from 
not using the on-street spots. Hence choosing the lower on-street price, and inducing use of 
the on-street market, becomes more preferable. 
 
 
VI. Concluding  remarks 
 
 
The economic analysis of urban parking policy has abstracted from the presence of 
the off-street market. This misspecification of the problem is important, as the amount of on-
street searching behaviour depends on both the on- and off-street market price.This paper has 
demonstrated that the off-street supply conditions have important implications for 
government regulation of the on-street market. 
We stress four findings: 
•  The supply of urban off-street parking is optimal if the shadow cost of on-street parking 
(given that all drivers park on-street) is greater than the resource cost of off-street parking 
(i.e. Lemma 1). We expect this to be the case for large metropolitan areas, and hence, 
sound analysis of on-street parking policy should consider the presence of an off-street 
market.   23
•  If the off-street market is competitive, Proposition 1 gives that a sufficient condition to 
maximise welfare is to set the on-street price equal to the off-street level. This is a 
striking result, with the attractive feature that it requires minimal information to 
implement.  
•  A common regulatory alternative to a meter fee, a simple time restriction, whereby 
drivers are allowed to park for free for any length of time up to a given limit, is not 
efficient. Even when set optimally, this non-linear price induces too many drivers to 
search for an on-street spot. 
•  If the off-street market is non-competitive, the optimal on-street policy deviates from the 
simple matching policy. In our set-up, the government acts as the Stackelberg leader, 
while a monopolistic off-street supplier is the follower. Optimal policy pursues one of 
two options: either set a relatively high on-street price, and induce the off-street 
monopolist to undercut the on-street market, or set a relatively low on-street price, in the 
knowledge that the monopolist profit maximises on the residual demand curve. The 
former strategy induces all drivers to proceed to the off-street market, and thus eliminates 
socially-wasteful search costs. In addition, there are welfare gains from inducing the off-
street monopolist to set a lower price. The latter strategy, in contrast, induces all drivers to 
search, but requires a smaller supply of the higher resource cost off-street space.  Which 
of the two strategies is optimally chosen is shown to be parameter dependent. For 
reference values, we find that government optimally sets a relatively high on-street price. 
But with small deviations in some parameters, the alternative option is optimal 
 
The model is simple, transparent and tractable. Moreover, crisp and policy relevant 
results emerge. However, it is important to stress some limitations of the model.  
We model the on-street market as a single point in space. This differs from the 
explicitly spatial models of AP-V and AR, in which, for instance, on-streets spots closer to 
the desired destination are a higher quality product than those further away (due to reduced 
walk costs). As a consequence, on-street policy in our model is not concerned with the 
distribution of on-street parkers over available spaces. However, the key insight of our model 
will emerge in a spatial setting: the number of on-street searchers will depend on price and 
supply conditions on both markets. Relatively low on-street pricing will induce more and 
more drivers to search on-street until the equilibrium cost equals the off-street price. Both the 
parking-span and the distribution of searching will be distorted. We conjecture that a variant 
of Proposition 1 will emerge: in the optimum, the marginal social cost of an additional on-
street parker must equal resource cost of off-street parking.   24
Other margins of driver behaviour, not captured in this model, may be important. In 
particular, drivers are loosely thought to be arriving at random: they cannot adjust departure 
time in order to increase the probability of finding a vacant spot by arriving in the ‘shoulders’ 
of the peak period
19. Drivers are also assumed to be unable to gain information on the 
probability of finding a vacant space, nor is there a market allowing drivers to buy space in 
advance of arrival: see AR for some initial work on this topic. 
We limit our investigation of non-competitive off-street supply to one particularly 
simple benchmark. Whilst this is sufficient to demonstrate that government may not wish to 
pursue a simple matching policy, one can imagine more realistic representations of the 
market, with a small number of spatially differentiated suppliers. 
Finally, the model is greatly simplified by assuming identical consumers. New 
insights can potentially be gained from integrating heterogeneity. For instace, policy makers 
tend to think in terms of a long-term stay market (often at some distance from the city centre) 
and a short-term parking market (close to the centre), with special provision needed for those 
with a high cost of walking. Is this type of separating equilibrium desirable, and if so, what 
type of pricing and regulatory mix is best suited to decentralise it?  
                                                      
19 Calthrop (2001) Chapter 5 uses a non-stationary stochastic queueing model to derive the optimal 
time profile of parking fees. Drivers choose when to schedule arrivals, given a common preferred time 
of facility usage. The results suggest that the optimal pricing schedule is non-linear. A time of arrival 
related component acts to spread arrivals efficiently throughout the peak period, while a length of stay 
component acts to limit parking time to the efficient level.   25
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Annex 1 – The centralised allocation problem. 
 
The optimisation problem facing the government is the maximisation of (6) with 
respect to  , XY tt  and λ , subject to the set of constraints (7).  
Assume the in the optimal solution the on-street market is used: i.e.  0, 0 X t λ >> . 
The set of complementarity slackness conditions reduces to: 
  [] 12 2 () () 0 XY Y
Q
ut ut C t γγ
λ
−− − −=  (A1a) 
  2 [1 ] 0 X t λ γ − −=  (A1b) 
  [ ][ ] 11 0 YY tt C λ − −− =  (A1c) 
  1[1 ] 0 γ λ − =  (A1d)




− =  (A1e) 
Now we establish that the solutions presented are optimal. 
Case 1 
Setting  1 λ = , implies, via (A1c) that  Y t is indeterminate.  Assume  X Qt > , and 
hence (A1e) implies that the shadow price of an on-street parking spot  2 0 γ = , and hence 
from  that  1
C
X t = . The remaining variable,  1 0 γ ≥ , is solved from equation (A1a) for any 
value of  [ ] 0,1 Y t ∈ . 
Case 2 
Setting  1 λ = , implies, via (A1c) that  Y t is indeterminate. Assume that  2 0 γ > , and 
hence, via (A1e), that  X tQ = . Equation (A1b) then gives that the shadow price of an 
additional unit of on-street parking,  2 γ ,is equal to 1 Q − . Substituting the result into (A1a) 
gives that  1 (1 ) (1 ) Y vQ vt γ =−−−, which is positive if  [ ] 0, Y tQ ∈ . 
Case 3 (Proof of Lemma 1) 
Assume  2 0 γ >  and  1 0 γ = . Equation (A1c) implies that  1
C






λ = . Using (A1b), and substituting into (A1a) gives that  (1 ) ( ) 0
C
X vt v C − −= . Hence, 
1
CC
XY tt C == − . 
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To maintain notational consistency, it is more convenient to define the simple time 
restriction parameter, r, in terms of an implicit price,  1
r
X p r = − . We also assume throughout 
that the off-street price is set equal to marginal resource cost, C. 
We can write  () ( ) [ 1 ]
rr r
XX X ur vp p p =+ −  and define the expected payoff from 
choosing to search by: 
{ } { } (, ) () [ 1 ][ 1 ] ( )
rr r r r
SX X X X vpC v p p p v C d ρρ =+ − + − −  
Drivers search as long as  ()
r
S vv C ≥ , and thus we write the equation for the 
equilibrium number of searchers as: 
{}
*
1i f ( )
( , ) ( ) [1 ] ( ) otherwise
[1 ]





















and a welfare function is given by: 
** (, ) (, ) [ 1 ] ( )
rr r




We proceed to maximise expression(A3). This welfare function is discontinuous (at a 
time restriction such that  ()
rr
X X p pC =  and non-differentiable at price  ()
rr
XX p pC = . We 
proceed by deriving local optima in the three critical regions: region 1 -  ()
rr
XX p pC < ; region 
2 -  () ()
rr r
XX X p Cpp C ≤≤ ; and, finally, region 3 -  ()
rr
X X p pC > . The globally optimal 
solution is then identified. 
 
Region 1:  ()
rr
XX p pC <  
 
In this region, the welfare function (A3) reduces to  (, )
rr
SX vpC . The first-order 
derivative  - the marginal benefit from a reduction in the time restriction – can be derived (via 
Roy’s rule) and is given by:   28















X p Cd =− − −  
Hence the locally optimal price occurs either at an interior point, 
1 rr
XX p p =  or at the 
corner solution  ()
rr
XX p pC = . 
 
Region 2:  () ()
rr r
XX X p Cpp C ≤≤  
 
Rewrite the welfare function (A3): 
* (, ) [ ( ) ]( )
()
rr





where the second line follows from the definition of the search equilibrium.  
Under a time restriction, there is no ‘wedge’ between consumer surplus and social 
surplus on the on-street market. Hence, in equilibrium, drivers keep choosing to 
search until any expected net consumer surplus from choosing to search equals the 
expected search cost. The net gain in social welfare from choosing to search is zero. 
Each driver contributes  () vC to social welfare regardless of whether they choose to 
search or not. 
It is direct that the marginal benefit of increasing the implicit price (or 
reducing the time restriction) is zero. The set of optimal solutions is given by: 
[( ) ,( ) ]
rr
X X p CpC. 
 
Region 3:  ()
rr
X X p pC >  
 
No one-uses the on-street market. As in region 2, the marginal benefit of increasing 
the implicit price is zero. The set of local optima is given by: (( ) , 1 ]
r
X pC  
 
Without loss of generality, the global optimum can be found from the set:  
{ }
1,( ) , 1
rr
XX pp C . It is straightforward to establish that  (1, ) ( ( ), )
r
X WCW p C C < , and thus the 
search for the global optimum can be restricted to the interior and corner solution from region 
1.    29
For reference parameter values, 
1 ()
rr
XX p pC < . Therefore the optimal implicit price is 
given by 
12 11 [ 1 ] 2
rr
XX p rp C d =−= =− − − . 






































































Figure 2 The decentralised allocation with a linear fee    
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